Papers
CEPR2026

Optimal Subsidies for Capital Replacement and the Green Transition

Fabio Bertolotti, Andrea Lanteri, Hyeonsik Yoon

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1
Latest record
2026-06-01
Primary source
CEPR
TL;DR

We analyze optimal subsidies for the replacement of durable assets in a model with heterogeneous producers, endogenous capital-embodied innovation, and environmental externalities that depend on capital vintages.

CEPRPublic FinanceStructuralTheory
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Sources
CEPR
Fields
Public Finance
Methods and data
StructuralTheory
Abstract

We analyze optimal subsidies for the replacement of durable assets in a model with heterogeneous producers, endogenous capital-embodied innovation, and environmental externalities that depend on capital vintages. We characterize the constrained-efficient allocation assuming a planner chooses capital replacement subject to the equilibrium evolution of innovation. Optimal subsidies equal the sum of two terms: (i) the difference in present discounted value of damages associated with old vs. new capital and (ii) the social value of innovation induced by capital replacement, net of the associated markup distortion. We generalize this formula to the case of new technologies, such as electric vehicles. We calibrate the model using empirical evidence on several types of capital, including aircraft and vehicles, and simulate the optimal transition. Initially, optimal subsidies are steeply increasing in the age of the replaced asset. In the long run, they are determined by the trade-off between innovation and markups.

Source versions
CEPR2026-06-01
Discussion Paper DP21578
DP21578
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