Papers
EJ2026

Taxation of Capital–Capital Levies and Commitment

Robert J Barro, V V Chari

Source versions
1
Latest record
2026-05-25
Primary source
EJ
TL;DR

Chamley and Judd argued that optimal taxation dictates zero long-run taxes on capital income, but Straub and Werning found that these taxes may be positive in the steady state.

EJLaborPublic Finance
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Sources
EJ
Fields
LaborPublic Finance
Methods and data
Descriptive
Abstract

Chamley and Judd argued that optimal taxation dictates zero long-run taxes on capital income, but Straub and Werning found that these taxes may be positive in the steady state. These models feature a ‘period-zero problem’ because the Ramsey formulation omits past commitments but includes future ones. Chari, Nicolini, and Teles (2020) add commitments to the representative household’s wealth in utility units. Then a nonzero capital levy may apply in period 1, future tax rates on asset income equal zero, and tax rates on consumption are constant. Time-consistency fails if future policymakers are unconstrained but holds if wealth commitments in each period are strict enough to motivate each policymaker to choose zero capital levies. Then a timeless perspective applies where period 1 is not special, tax rates on asset income are always zero, and tax rates on consumption are constant. In the neoclassical growth model with utility depending on the log of consumption, the level of the wealth commitment is constant in the steady state. Extensions allow for uncertainty and heterogeneity and for a form of partial commitment.

Source versions
EJ2026-05-25
The Economic Journal
10.1093/ej/ueag069
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