Why Does Disability Insurance Enrollment Increase During Recessions? Evidence from Medicare
Colleen Carey, Nolan Miller, David Molitor
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) awards rise in recessions, especially for workers over age 50.
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) awards rise in recessions, especially for workers over age 50. We use Medicare data to investigate how health, entry costs, and age-based DI eligibility rules shape this pattern. Entrants induced by recessions have lower medical spending and mortality than typical recipients. Entry responses to unemployment jump two- to fourfold at ages 50 and 55, when eligibility rules relax. Using these age-based discontinuities as instruments, we find no shift in marginal entrants' health across unemployment levels. These findings show that DI's age-based eligibility rules are a primary driver of cyclical entry, while health shocks are not.
Just Ask Them Twice: Choice Probabilities and Identification of Ex ante returns and Willingness-To-Pay
Romuald Méango, Esther Mirjam Girsberger
Labour Market Power and the Effects of Fiscal Policy
Christian Bredemeier, Babette Jansen, Roland Winkler
Willingness-To-Pay versus Administrative Hurdles: Understanding Barriers to Social Insurance Enrollment in Thailand
Benjamin A. Olken, Rema Hanna, Phitawat Poonpolkul, Nada Wasi
“Compensate the Losers?” Economic Policy and the Origins of U.S. Partisan Realignment
Ilyana Kuziemko, Nicolas Longuet-Marx, Suresh Naidu