The Effects of Mandatory Profit-Sharing on Workers and Firms: Evidence from France

Since 1967, all French firms with more than 100 employees have been required to share a fraction of their excess profits with their employees.

Since 1967, all French firms with more than 100 employees have been required to share a fraction of their excess profits with their employees. Through this scheme, firms with excess profits distribute, on average, 10.5% of their pre-tax income to workers. In 1990, the eligibility threshold was reduced to 50 employees. We exploit this regulatory change to identify the effects of mandated profit-sharing on firms and their employees. The cost of mandated profit-sharing for firms is evident in the significant bunching at the 100-employee threshold observed prior to the reform, which completely disappears post-reform. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that, at the firm level, mandated profit-sharing (a) increases the labor share by 1.8 percentage points, (b) reduces the profit share by 1.4 percentage points, and (c) has small to non-existent effects on investment and productivity. At the employee level, mandated profit-sharing increases lower-skilled workers’ total compensation and leaves high-skilled workers’ total compensation unchanged. Overall, mandated profit-sharing redistributes excess profits to lower-skilled workers in the firm without generating significant distortions or productivity effects.